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Finally Free to Green Agriculture Policy? UK 
post- Brexit Policy Developments in the Shadow 
of the CAP and Devolution
Enfin libres de verdir la politique agricole ? L’évolution de la 
politique britannique après le Brexit à l’ombre de la PAC et de la 
déconcentration
Endlich frei für eine grüne Agrarpolitik? Die politischen Post- Brexit- 
Entwicklungen des Vereinigten Königreichs im Schatten der GAP und 
der Dezentralisierung
Viviane Gravey
The UK government has pledged to 
deliver a ‘Green Brexit’ – with at its 
heart profoundly different agricultural 
policies post- Brexit, ‘which put the 
environment first’ (HM Government, 
2018a, p. 4). While different Brexit 
scenarios include diverging trading 
arrangements with the European 
Union, all Brexit options mean 
leaving the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and developing new 
domestic alternatives to the CAP. This 
article investigates what these new 
policies herald for the agri- 
environment. It reviews both past UK 
commitments to greening agriculture 
and current UK agricultural policy 
developments to gauge whether the 
promised ‘Green Brexit’ is not more 
of the same. It argues that far from 
breaking free of the CAP, the UK 
appears to be restaging central 
debates of previous rounds of CAP 
reform, on the budget, on greening, 
and on WTO obligations. Further-
more, while it is too early to judge 
the outcome of policy development, 
this article highlights a number of 
concerns about the process of 
agriculture policy- making in the UK 
which casts doubt on the UK’s ability 
to deliver coherent and ambitious 
policy change.
The UK has repeatedly pioneered agri- environmental policy instruments within the EU.
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The UK’s complex relationship 
with greening the CAP
The UK has repeatedly pioneered 
agri- environmental policy instruments 
within the EU. It was an early adopter 
of Environmentally Sensitive Areas in 
the mid- 1980s, of cross- compliance in 
the 1990s and of modulation between 
the CAP’s first and second pillars, in 
order to increase funding for rural 
development in the early 2000s; and it 
called for a public money for public 
goods model during the CAP 2013 
reform. Beyond the government, UK 
environmental NGOs have played a 
key role in raising awareness of the 
environmental impacts of the CAP and 
advocating for reform alongside their 
European partners (Petetin et al., 2019).
Yet UK support for greening agricul-
ture has long been conditioned by 
the UK’s attitude to the CAP and the 
EU as a whole. Spending for agri- 
environment schemes is part of the 
CAP second pillar, requiring domestic 
co- funding. A comparison between 
UK and Irish spending on rural 
development illustrates how the UK’s 
long- standing reluctance to increase 
EU- related spending has repeatedly 
constrained the UK’s commitment to 
agri- environment schemes (Cardwell, 
2010). Hence, for the 2014–2020 
period, Ireland is spending more on 
co- funding rural development 
(Figure 1) than the four UK nations 
combined, and is spending over three 
times as much in co- funding as 
England alone. CAP greening instru-
ments have also fallen foul of a 
second UK target namely, EU red 
tape. This was apparent during the 
2016 EU referendum campaign when 
the official Leave campaign vowed to 
get rid of the EU’s ‘hated cross 
compliance regime’ and pledged 
overall to ‘reduce regulations on 
farmers’ (Vote Leave, 2016). Shortly 
after the referendum, the then 
Secretary of the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra), Andrea Leadsom MP, 
promised there would be ‘no more, 
ridiculous, bureaucratic three- crop 
rule’ (Leadsom, 2017).
While the UK’s reluctance to spend 
more on EU schemes has limited the 
UK’s budget available for rural 
development overall, UK rural 
development schemes are putting a 
greater priority on agri- environment- 
climate (AEC) schemes than the EU 
average (Figure 2). But there is a 
wide variation within the UK, with a 
high of 69 per cent of rural develop-
ment budget spent on AEC schemes 
in England compared to only 19 per 
cent in Scotland.
This sharp divide illustrates how 
under the flexible umbrella of the 
2014–2020 CAP each of the UK’s four 
nations have developed divergent 
farming policies. It exposes a further 
problem: when it comes to agricul-
ture, England is not representative of 
Great Britain or of the United 
Kingdom as a whole. This presump-
tion was frequent in the aftermath of 
the EU referendum. For example, 
there was a call by ‘Britain’s largest 
farmer’, the National Trust, in August 
2016 for direct payments to be 
phased out and ‘British’ farm subsi-
dies to take the form of AEC 
schemes; this was first and foremost a 
conversation in a specific English 
context where AEC already dominat-
Figure 1: Rural development funding, 2014–2020 (million euros)
Source: European Commission (2019b).
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Figure 2: Agri- environment- climate payment share of rural development 
 funding (%)
Source: European Commission (2019b).
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“Les mêmes débats et lignes de faille, qui ont longtemps animé les 
débats politiques dans 
l’Union européenne, 
sont reproduits à plus 
petite échelle au 
Royaume- Uni.
”
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ed rural development (The Guardian, 
2016). More concerning perhaps was 
Michael Gove’s first speech as Defra 
Secretary, ‘The Unfrozen Moment - 
Delivering a Green Brexit’ in June 
2017; the speech failed to mention 
devolution, or to acknowledge that a 
Green Brexit was not in his gift, but 
would require co- operation with the 
three devolved administrations for it 
to be delivered (Gove, 2017).
An ‘environmental super power’ 
in the making?
On his arrival at Defra in June 2017, 
Gove expressed very different views 
on farming and the environment than 
his predecessor. Whereas Leadsom 
focused on ‘cutting the red tape that 
comes out of Brussels’, stating her 
plans would ‘free our farmers to grow 
more, sell more and export more 
great British food’ (Leadsom, 2017), 
Gove pledged to turn the UK into an 
‘environmental and economic super-
power’. These two different perspec-
tives, co- habiting within the same 
political party, illustrate how stake-
holders face a new lack of long- term 
certainty as policies become depend-
ent on the vagaries of British politics.
Gove’s proposed new farming policy 
is a cornerstone of his ‘Green Brexit’ 
agenda, set out in a consultation paper 
in February 2018: Health and Har-
mony: the Future for Food, Farming 
and the Environment in a Green 
Brexit (Defra, 2018). Health and 
Harmony centres on: first, a ‘public 
money for public goods’ agenda; 
second on a gradual phasing out of 
direct payments during an ‘agricultural 
transition’ as farmers become more 
competitive and less reliant on 
subsidies; and third on a new ‘regula-
tory culture’, with a re- think of 
enforcement, penalties, risk manage-
ment and support for innovation.
Contrary to Gove’s ‘Unfrozen Mo-
ment’ speech (2017), the Health and 
Harmony consultation acknowledges 
devolution, whilst opting for a 
‘balance between cohesion and 
flexibility’. Some commitments apply 
UK- wide, such as to ‘maintain the 
same cash total funding for the sector 
until the end of this parliament’. The 
document further guarantees ‘as a 
minimum, equivalent flexibility for 
tailoring policies to the specific needs 
of each territory as is afforded by 
current EU rules’ and promises a 
‘significant increase’ in decision- 
making power. Cohesion will be 
maintained via the establishment of a 
number of domestic UK common 
frameworks with a range of objectives 
from enabling the functioning of the 
UK internal market, to managing com-
mon resources and ensuring compli-
ance with international obligations.
The devolved administrations each 
responded to Health and Harmony 
by running a consultation of their 
own: Brexit and Our Land (Wales), 
Stability and Simplicity (Scotland), 
and NI Future Agriculture Policy 
Framework (Northern Ireland) (Hart 
and Maréchal, 2018). Some key 
differences emerge – both Scotland 
and Northern Ireland are keen for 
some, smaller amounts, of direct 
payments to continue for some time 
whereas England and Wales favour 
UK rural development schemes are putting a greater priority on agri- environment- 
climate (AEC) schemes than the EU average.
“Dieselben Diskussionen und Meinungsverschieden-
heiten, die seit langem 
die Debatten über die 
EU- Politik anheizen, 
werden in kleinerem 
Umfang ebenso im 
Vereinigten Königreich 
wiederholt.
”
UK support for greening agriculture has long been conditioned by the UK’s attitude to 
the CAP and the EU as a whole.
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quicker phasing out. Some analysts 
believe that Health and Harmony’s 
cut to direct payments is likely to 
lead to a sharp drop in the number of 
farmers in England (estimated at 25 
per cent; see Dobbs et al., 2018); 
conversely proposals in the rest of 
the UK are intent on minimising 
structural change. While public goods 
are mentioned in all four consultation 
documents, ‘only in England is the 
principle of “public money for public 
goods” fully followed through into 
policy design’ (Hart and Maréchal, 
2018, p. 3). Some commonalities can 
be found too. On environmental 
issues, a major shift away from 
previous implementation of the CAP 
in all four nations is an attempt to 
pay farmers for environmental 
outcomes, not practices; and the use 
of pilot schemes to test new ap-
proaches. Wales and Northern Ireland 
are keen for funding for public goods 
to go beyond income foregone and 
additional costs, but this raises 
questions about compatibility with 
WTO commitments. Finally, the 
proposals mention an environmental 
regulatory baseline, but fail to define 
it (Hart and Maréchal, 2018).
What should we make of Health and 
Harmony’s call for flexibility and 
cohesion? The four consultations 
reveal different visions for farming 
and the environment behind the 
shared language of public goods: 
also on whether policy should limit 
or encourage structural changes; and 
on where the environmental baseline 
separating ‘polluter pays’ from 
‘provider gets’ should be drawn 
(Matthews, 2013). Moreover, there is 
very little on cohesion in these 
consultations. Cohesion- building is 
instead parked – pending a distinct 
process of UK intergovernmental 
discussions on the establishment of 
common frameworks in areas such as 
agriculture and the environment 
where EU law intersects with de-
volved competence – under the 
umbrella of the Joint Ministerial 
Committee. However, this process is 
failing to deliver an agreed environ-
mental baseline. In April 2018 the UK 
Cabinet Office proposed its own list 
of common frameworks, which 
surveyed 153 policy areas of EU law 
(HM Government, 2018b). The 
document argued that, for 24 of these 
areas, legislative common UK 
frameworks may be needed, for 82 
non- legislative frameworks may be 
required, but for 49 policy areas no 
limits to policy divergence were 
considered necessary. Farming and 
food related issues – such as plant 
health, food labelling, pesticides, 
GMO marketing and cultivation, 
organic farming and agricultural 
support – formed the bulk of the 24 
areas for legislative frameworks. 
Conversely, environmental policy was 
split between three categories: chemi-
cals would see legislative frame-
works, air quality non- legislative 
frameworks, and water quality no 
frameworks at all. This major shift 
away from legislative frameworks 
binding for all four nations (as EU 
directives and regulations were) 
highlights the support for increased 
policy divergence overall, and the 
lack of commitment to maintaining a 
common environmental baseline 
across the UK. This opens the way 
for many shades of green in UK 
agriculture after Brexit – not a 
coherent environmental ‘superpower’.
Brexit policy- making in the 
shadow of the CAP
Understanding the long- lasting 
influence of the CAP on future UK 
policy matters is, in part, linked to the 
European Commission’s views on 
future trade and competition: ‘as from 
the date of Brexit, the UK would 
become overnight the main agri- food 
trade partner of the EU, both in terms 
of exports and of imports’ (European 
Commission, 2019a). The CAP, despite 
increasing variation among Member 
States, aimed to maintain a certain level 
playing field and fair competition. The 
Irish ‘backstop’, as set out under the 
draft UK- EU Withdrawal Agreement, 
aims to maintain this level playing field 
through the continued application of 
key EU food standard regulations in 
Northern Ireland, and capping UK 
agricultural support in relation to both 
past UK support and contemporary EU 
support. It is also a story of path 
dependence. Health and Harmony and 
even more so its devolved counterparts 
are embracing gradual change, with a 
long transition away from the CAP and 
in part a continuation of direct 
payments. Critically, the present path 
dependence goes beyond detailed 
policy instruments and debates on 
whether direct payments would be 
phased out and how. In many ways, 
the same debates and fault lines, which 
have long animated EU policy debates, 
are replicated on a smaller scale within 
the UK (Petetin et al., 2019).
Current debates in the UK echo discussions during the CAP 2013 reform: what is an 
equitable repartition of funding between countries?
“The same debates and fault lines, which have long animated EU 
policy debates, are 
replicated on a smaller 
scale within the 
UK.
”
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The issue of WTO compliance, central 
to past CAP debates, is making a 
comeback. The four nations disagree 
on how to interpret the WTO’s green 
box rules when it comes to paying for 
public goods as both Wales and 
Northern Ireland want to go beyond 
‘income foregone’ (Hart and Maréchal, 
2018). Conversely, the UK Agriculture 
Bill gives Defra the power to limit the 
amount of spending across all three 
WTO boxes (amber, blue and green), 
thereby limiting the ability for the 
devolved nations to spend more than 
England (Dobbs et al., 2018). Current 
debates in the UK echo discussions 
during the CAP 2013 reform: what is 
an equitable repartition of funding 
between countries? Most funding for 
the devolved administrations in the UK 
is linked mainly to population num-
ber, under what is called the Barnett 
formula. EU funding – notably CAP 
and regional funding – is not linked to 
this formula. Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales would all lose large 
proportions of their farming funding if 
it were to be allocated on a population 
basis. Gove promised that Defra will 
oversee the design of a new reparti-
tion key, meaning that the department 
making policy for England will decide 
what is ‘fair’ in sharing spending 
across the UK. Finally, both the current 
CAP reform and the post- Brexit policy 
in the UK are faced with a same 
problem: how to allow greater 
divergence without undermining an 
environmental level playing field.
In conclusion, while the UK govern-
ment’s current commitment to ‘put 
the environment first’ calls for radical 
post- Brexit change, the policy- making 
process does not augur well for such 
change. Instead, it bears sharp 
similarities to CAP debates old and 
new. Within the EU, the UK’s 
commitment to greening agriculture 
was repeatedly undermined by its 
opposition to increased spending for 
CAP and its growing euroscepticism. 
Outside of the EU, the UK’s renewed 
commitment to greening agriculture 
risks faltering once more due to 
broader national and international 
political tensions. These difficulties 
are linked to fraught power sharing 
under devolution, the challenges of 
guaranteeing a shared environmental 
baseline across the UK, and agreeing 
a fair budget for agriculture policy 
throughout the four nations, as well 
as the uncertain contour of any 
UK- EU deal and future UK trade 
policy.
Viviane Gravey, Queen’s University, Belfast, UK.
Email: V.Gravey@qub.ac.uk
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Finally Free to Green  
Agriculture Policy? UK 
post- Brexit Policy  
Developments in the 
Shadow of the CAP and 
Devolution
Since the EU referendum, the UK 
government has pledged to deliver 
a ‘Green Brexit’, with a profound 
rethink of agricultural policies in line 
with a ‘public money for public goods’ 
agenda. Will Brexit finally set the UK 
government free to green its farming 
policies? To answer this question, this 
article looks back at the UK’s Common 
Agricultural Policy greening record and 
at early proposals for future UK policy. 
It shows that while UK governments 
have pioneered and pushed for many 
green instruments in the CAP, their 
overarching priority remained to limit 
funding – both EU and national – for 
agriculture. After Brexit, the UK will be 
leaving the CAP, yet early policy 
discussions in the UK show that UK 
decision- makers face very similar 
challenges to their EU counterparts: 
how should agriculture policy be 
funded and how should funding be 
shared between the UK four nations? 
How much divergence in policy is 
acceptable without threatening the level 
playing field? In the UK these 
challenges are compounded by, first, 
the devolution settlements, with 
agriculture and environment in 
devolved competences while trade is 
reserved to the UK government; and 
second, the uncertainties surrounding 
the future trading relationships among 
the UK, the EU and the wider world.
Enfin libres de verdir 
la politique agricole ? 
L’évolution de la  
politique britannique 
après le Brexit à l’ombre 
de la PAC et de la  
déconcentration
Depuis le référendum sur l’Union 
européenne (UE), le gouvernement 
britannique s’est engagé à mettre en 
place un «Brexit vert», repensant en 
profondeur les politiques agricoles 
conformément au programme «Des 
fonds publics pour les biens publics». 
Le Brexit va- t- il enfin permettre au 
gouvernement britannique de verdir ses 
politiques agricoles? Pour répondre à 
cette question, cet article se penche sur 
le bilan de la politique agricole 
commune du Royaume- Uni en matière 
de verdissement et sur les premières 
propositions relatives à la future 
politique du Royaume- Uni. Cela montre 
que les gouvernements du Royaume- 
Uni ont été des pionniers dans ce 
domaine et ont poussé à l’adoption de 
nombreux instruments verts dans la 
PAC, mais que leur priorité absolue 
restait de limiter le financement - à la 
fois européen et national - de 
l’agriculture. Après le Brexit, le 
Royaume- Uni quittera la PAC. Pourtant, 
les premières discussions au Royaume- 
Uni montrent que les décideurs de 
l’action publique britanniques sont 
confrontés à des défis très similaires à 
ceux de leurs homologues de l’UE: 
comment financer la politique agricole 
et partager les fonds entre les quatre 
nations du Royaume- Uni ? Quelle 
divergence dans les politiques est 
acceptable sans menacer les règles du 
jeu équitables? Au Royaume- Uni, ces 
défis sont aggravés par, premièrement, 
les accords sur la décentralisation, 
l’agriculture et l’environnement étant 
des compétences dévolues, le 
commerce étant réservé au 
gouvernement britannique; et 
deuxièmement, les incertitudes 
entourant les futures relations 
commerciales entre le Royaume- Uni, 
l’UE et le monde entier.
Endlich frei für eine 
grüne Agrarpolitik? Die 
politischen Post- Brexit- 
Entwicklungen des Ver-
einigten Königreichs im 
Schatten der GAP und 
der Dezentralisierung
Seit dem EU- Referendum hat sich die 
britische Regierung dazu verpflichtet, 
einen “Grünen Brexit” umzusetzen, bei 
dem die Agrarpolitik in Übereinstimmung 
mit der Agenda “Öffentliche Gelder für 
öffentliche Güter” grundlegend überdacht 
werden soll. Wird der Brexit der Regierung 
des Vereinigten Königreiches endlich die 
Freiheit geben, ihre Agrarpolitik 
umweltfreundlicher zu gestalten? Um diese 
Frage zu beantworten, blickt dieser Beitrag 
auf die ökologische Bilanz der 
Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik des Vereinigten 
Königreichs und auf erste Vorschläge für 
eine zukünftige Politik des Vereinigten 
Königreichs zurück. Es stellt sich heraus, 
dass die britischen Regierungen zwar 
Pionierarbeit geleistet und sich für viele 
grüne Instrumente in der GAP eingesetzt 
haben, dass aber ihre übergeordnete 
Priorität nach wie vor darin besteht, die 
Agrarausgaben - sowohl die der EU als 
auch der Mitgliedsstaaten - zu begrenzen. 
Nach dem Brexit wird das Vereinigte 
Königreich aus der GAP ausscheiden. 
Frühe politische Diskussionen im 
Vereinigten Königreich zeigen jedoch, dass 
die Entscheidungsträger dort vor sehr 
ähnlichen Herausforderungen stehen wie 
ihre EU- Pendants: Auf welche Weise soll 
die Agrarpolitik finanziert werden und wie 
sollten die Mittel zwischen den vier 
britischen Nationalstaaten aufgeteilt 
werden? Wie viele Politikabweichungen 
sind vertretbar, ohne dass die 
Chancengleichheit gefährdet wird? Im 
Vereinigten Königreich werden diese 
Herausforderungen noch folgendermaßen 
verschärft: erstens durch die 
Dezentralisierungsabkommen, wobei 
Landwirtschaft und Umwelt in dezentralen 
Zuständigkeitsbereichen liegen, während 
der Handel der Regierung des Vereinigten 
Königreichs vorbehalten ist. Und zweitens 
durch die Unsicherheiten in Bezug auf 
künftige Handelsbeziehungen zwischen 
dem Vereinigten Königreich, der EU und 
dem Rest der Welt.
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